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JUDICIAL LEGISLATIVE ESTOPPEL
R. Mason Lisle, of the Pennsylvania Bar.
Judicial legislative estoppel-stated broadly but with sufficie.vt
accuracy for the purpose of this paper-may be defined 
to be: The
refusal of a court, by reason of its application of the doctrine 
of
estoppel, to execute a constitutional legislative grant. 
This defini-
tion will be made clearer by an illustration: if a duly enacted 
con-
stitutional law, expressly provides that a corporation 
shall no:
change its fundamental charter provisions, under its 
power to
alter and amend its charter, and, the corporation proceeds-not-
withstanding this limited power of ilteration-to enact 
an amend-
ment to its charter which does change its fundamental 
provisions
and then enters into a contract upon the basis of this 
illegal funda-
mental change; in such an event, no matter how the 
question
conies before a court-if not in a collateral way,.when 
it is really
not before the court at all-the court must declare the 
contract,
which is in violation of the fundamental charter provisions, 
ultra
,ires ab initio and illegal, not v6idable but wholly void 
and of no
legal effect, for, if the court permits the contract to stand, 
by rea-
son of the conduct of any party to the contract, it is exercising 
a
judicial legislative estoppel-a thing abhorrent; where 
the law is
supreme. In other words, a court which permits an 
illegal con-
tract to stand, by its application of an estoppel, is defeating 
the
legislative intent, for the reason, that the court is, .thereby, 
mak-
ing itself superior to the legislature in the legislative 
sphere. Of
course, a court should condemn an unconstitutional 
law, but it
cannot take unto itself the authority to change a constitutional 
leg-
islative grant, by an estoppel, for, if a court so proceeds, it is,
thereby, necessarily, permitting a corporation to do what 
the legis-
lature has said it shall not do and it is thus thrusting 
itself into a
position of superiority to the legislature, as a law-maker.
One of our greatest dangers comes from the fact that 
our peo-
ple are rapidly approaching a condition of unwillingness 
to be
governed by the law-almost all our efforts are devoted 
to the
discovery of some method by which we can escape the law,
rather than evincing a devotion to the staunch maintenance 
of the
unquestionably sound proposition: the law is supreme 
and no one
is superior to it. In his recent address before the Bar 
Associa-
tions of Virginia and Maryland, Mr. Justice Lurton, 
practically
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took this subject as his theme. What he said is so thoroughly
sound, we venture to quote from a newspaper clipping-assuming
it to be correct, for, it has such a true ring and expresses so ac-
curately the principle under which only our government can
endure:
"Which shall it be," Mr. Justice Lurton said, "a government
of law or a government of men? Is there not a growing disposi-
tion to disregard the limitations which we have placed upon those
in authority and a tendency to applaud the doing of things which
we wish done, regardless of whether lawful or unlawful? If
one in power does things which displease us, we are swift to in-
quire into his authority, but is that so of the things done which
meet with our approval? Our Government is properly a govern-
ment of law. Our courts should simply exercise their judicial
powers and no court should assume legislative power."
And, we add, following Mr. Justice Lurton's thought, it is
not a government of law when a court exercises a judicial legis-
lative estoppel, f6r, then, it becomes a government of men-of
the judiciary-rather than of law.
Happily, the instances of this exercise of judicial legislative
estoppel are not many, but when they have occurred, they are
generally found to have been exercised in the cases of. ultra vires
and illegal corporate contracts. Whilst this error has been made
in courts inferior to the United States Supreme Court and in the
courts of vaiious states, we add, with great pleasure, that the
Supreme Court of the United States has never made such a "slip."
The question has come up in this latter court very many times,
presented differently, and argued differently; but it will be recog-
nized that, in the final analysis, the controlling and enduring fac-
tor, although not always so stated, because not directly developed
in the argument, has been the impossibility of supporting a judi-
cial legislative estoppel.
It is a well known rule of law-always followed in the Supreme
Court of the United States, but not alw.yQ followed in other
courts-that, "the contract of a corporation, beyond the scope of
its powers, cannot be enforced or rendered enforceable by the ap-
plication of the doctrine of estoppel"; that is, an ultra sires ab
initio corporate contract i.s not voidable, but it is wholly void and
of no legal effect. The raison d'etre of this rule is founded upon
this principle of law; the judiciary exists for carrying out the law,
hence, it can never, by estoppel, render naught a legitimate legis-
lative -intent, for, if it does, it becomes itself, like the corporation,
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guilty of a violation of law-it is exercising a judicial legislative
estoppel-making law rather than interpreting it. This rule is
unalterable, never to be departed from; there are no exceptions
to it; it provides, not doubtfully, but clearly, that estoppel can-
not apply if its effect is to sustain an ultra vires corporate con-
tract; if estoppel is applied in such a case, it becomes-to repeat
myself-a judicial legislative estoppel, and the court issuing it
is, itself, guilty of taking part with the corporation in a violation
of law, but, as an old-time English judge said: "A court cannot
be made the handmaid of iniquity !" I The duty of the court-
its whole duty-is contained in this statement: "Courts are in-
stituted to carry out the laws. How can they become auxiliary to
the consummation of their violation?"
This rule of law is as old as the law itself and the principle of
law upon which it is founded had its origin in very early times, in
the common law. But, really, it may be said to have always
existed, for a principle of law is a truth and the sublime words
of Milton tell us: "Truth is next to the Almighty," hence, a
principle of law may be said, correctly, to have always existed.
But this principle first appeared in law, in causes of actions,
founded upon contracts contra bonos mores, and in speaking of
this type, Mr. Justice Peckham said: 2 "It is stated that Lord
Kenyon once said, by way of illustration, that he would not sit
to take an account between two robbers in Hounslow Heath."
Contracts involving bad morals, wherein the public is interested,
have never been sustained by the courts-for courts exist, not to
assist an iniquity, but to crush it. It was just this point which
led Sir William Grant 
3-- a -master mind in chancery-to say:
"No matter who complains of it, it is illegal. You cannot take a
step but through that illegal agreement and it is impossible for
the courts to enforce it." Of course, when the public interests are
not involved, that is, where the contract is not contra bonos mores,
one cannot give in evidence one's own fraud in defense of one's
own fraudulent acts, and the court, by estoppel, will decline to
interfere, or, as once said by a judge in such a case: "The court
will not help a rogue out of his toils."
It is really very clear, when and when not the court can exer-
cise an estoppel :' "When the public is not interested the maxim
'Also quoted in Bank of the U. S. v. Owens, 2 Peters, 538.
2McMuilin V. Hoffman, 174 U. S., 654.
a Thompson v. Thompson, 7 Ves., 470.
4 Appeal of Bredin, 92 Penna. St., 241.
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nemo allegans suam turpitudinem audiendus est is in full force
and the law leaves the parties as they placed themselves and the
authority of a long line of decisions prevents the abuse of this
maxim"; but, where the public is interested, this maxim does not
apply, for the reason that it is the court's province to execute the
law-not to make it, and, hence the court must prevent the evil
which would be produced by enforcing the contract or allowing it
to stand. There is not the slightest possible doubt of the correct-
ness of this last statement-unhappily, not always followed-and
the only question is: when is the public interested in a contract?
The public is interested: (i) when the contract is contra bonos
mores, and (2) in the case of a corporation, when the contract is
ultra vires of the corporate powers; that is, when the corporation
prop6ses to do what the people in legislature assembled, has
said it shall not do.
When corporations for profit came into existence, questions of
contracts ultra vires-not of bad morals-but of corporate chart-
ers, soon arose. There was only one way in which the judiciary
should have always considered these ultra -ires contracts and that
was in exactly the same way the earlier courts had dealt with
contracts contra bonos mores. The analogy is exact and the
Supreme Court of the United States has never failed to realize
it-this we will show in a moment by citations from that court.
A corporation-like the Government-is vested with limited, dele-
gated powers by the people through legislative act, and, for it to
exercise powers not granted nor necessarily implied, is to act out-
side the purpose of its existence-to give itself a power which is
unconstitutional, and such an unconstitutional power can no more
be supported by judicial legislative estoppel than can an unconsti-
tutional act of Congress or of a State Legislature be sustained.
In each case, the constitution is created by the people-the State
Constitution, by the people directly; the Corporation Constitution
by the people in their constitutionally elected Legislature assem-
bled; the same principle of law which condemns an act of Con-
gress or an act of the Legislature-violative of the Constitution,
condemns an act of a Corporation-violative of its Constitution.
The position of the judiciary, in reference to the National or State
Constitution, and in reference to the Corporation Constitution, in
a case of this kind, is identical: the court must enforce the law-
whether expressed by the people in a State Constitution, or by the
people, through their Legislature, in a Corporate Constitution,
and, if the judiciary fails to enforce the law, in either case, it is
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exercising a judicial legislative estoppel. The Supreme Court
of the United States recognizes to its fullest extent that ultra
vires and illegal corporate contracts are governed by the same
rule, which, from the earliest times, has always been applied to
contracts contra bonos mores and any impression that the rule is
confined, solely, in the case of corporations, to contracts contra
bonos mores, is distinctly negatived by Mr. Justice Gray :5 "The
contract of a corporation which is ultra vires in the proper sense,
that is to say, not because it is in itself immoral, but because it is
outside the objects of its creation, is not voidable, but wholly
void and of no legal effect," and the principle of law, applicable
to each type of case: (I) "contracts contra bonos mores, and (2)
contracts ultra vircs of corporate powers, is the same, and it has
been the guiding polar star in all the decisions in the Supreme
Court upon this question.
It is quite impossible to cite from the Supreme Court of the
United States all the authorities upon this question; but in order
to maintain my position, I must burden this paper with some cita-
tions, and I feel confident that those who read these citations
will be convinced that the Supreme Court is anchored-in splendid
holding ground, but that those inferior courts and those State
courts which, in some way or other, whilst recognizing the princi-
ple as applicable to contracts contra bonos mores, have failed to
apply the same principle to contracts ultra vires of corporate pow-
ers, are adrift 'way out at sea.
The Supreme Court has said :6
"No court of justice can be made the handmaid of iniquity.
Courts are instituted to carry into effect the laws-of the country.
How can they become auxiliary to the consummation of violation
of law? There can be no legal remedy for that which is itself
illegal; in such cases [ultra vires corporate contracts] there can
be no waiver, the defense is allowed, not for the sake of the de-
fendant [or, of any party to the contract], but of the law itself;
whenever the illegality appears, whether the evidence comes from
one side or the other, the disclosure is fatal to the case. No con-
sent of the defendant can neutralize its effect. A stipulation in
5 Central Transportation Co. v. Pullman Co., 139 U. S., 60.
6 Bank of the U. S. v. Owens, 2 Peters, 38; Coppell v. Hall, 7 Wall.,
558; Thomas v. Railroad, 101 U. S., 81-85; Penna. R. R. v. St. Louis R. R.,
118 U. S., 316-317; Central Transportation Co. v. Pullman Co., 139 U. S.,
55-60; Jacksonville Ry. v. Hooper, 160 U. S., 514; Union Pacific Ry. v.
Chicago Ry., 163 U. S., 581; McCormick v. Market Nat. Bank, 165 U. S.,
546.
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the most solemn form to waive the objection would be tainted with
the vice of the original contract and void for the same reason.
Where the contamination reaches, it destroys; an ultra vires
clause is not voidable, but wholly void and of no legal effect; it
cannot be enforced or rendered enforceable, by the application
of the doctrine of estoppel; the ultra vires cannot be ratified by
either party, no performance on either side can give the unlawful
contract any validity or be the foundation of any right of action
upon it; whether the act is ultra ires is a judicial question, to be
settled and determined by the courts and judges, and if ultra
vires, estoppel to support it, is totally inadmissible."
Mr. Justice White, in California Bank v. Kenned;y, said:
"Whatever divergence of opinion may arise in some of the State
courts, in this court it is settled in favor of the right of a cor-
poration to plead the want of power, that is to say, to assert the
nullity of the act, which is an ultra vires act." This statement of
the court, speaking through Mr. Justice White, is supplemental
of the earlier statement of the court, speaking through Mr. Jus-
tice Miller, in Thomas v. Railroad,8 and, considered together, they
show what has always been the inexorable rule of that court.
Mr. Justice Miller said: "Where a corporation, a party to a con-
tifiuing contract, which it had no power to make, seeks to retract
and refuses to proceed further, it cannot [by estoppel] be com-
pelled to continue the contract; having entered into an ultra
vires contract, it was the duty of the company to rescind or aban-
don it at the earliest moment, and it is a. rightful act when this is
done, for it is the performance of a legal duty." I must be par-
doned one more quotation. In O'Brien v. Wheelock,9 the act un-
der consideration was unconstitutional and Mr. Chief Justice
Fuller said:
"The court is asked to execute the act, either as in itself wholly
valid, or valid as to these defendants. We are unwilling to assent
to the doctrine of legislative estoppel (the italics are mine). The
courts cannot, by the execution of an unconstitutional law, as a
law, supply the want of power in the legislative department.1o In
South Carolina v. Perkins,"1 it is said: "There can be no estoppel
7 167 U. S., 367.
8 101 U. S., 81-85.
9 184 U. S., 489.
20 And, in the case of corporations, the court cannot, by the execu-
tion of an unconstitutional corporation law-unconstitutional in the sense
of ultra vires of the corporate powers granted by the legislature-as a
law, supply the want of poiver in the corporate constitution to enact the
said law. This, also, is judicial legislative estoppel.
1194 U. S., 267.
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in the way of ascertaining the existence of a law. That which
purports to be a law of a State is a law or it is not a law, accord-
ing as the truth of the fact may be and not in accordance to the
shifting circumstances of the parties. It would be an intolerable
state of things, if a document, purporting to be an act of the
legislature could thus be a law in one case and for one party and
not a law in another case and for another party; a law to-day and
not a law to-morrow; a law in one place and not a law in an-
other place in the same State. And whether it is a law or not a
law is a judicial question to be settled and determined by the
courts and judges. The doctrine of estoppel is totally inadmis-
sible in such cases.'"
Thus, it is perfectly apparent that the Supreme Court stands
ever ready, firm as a rock, to condemn the assumption of legisla-
tive functions by the judiciary-all the fine traditions of that court
and its decisions, founded, as we have shown, upon the true prin-
ciple of law, present an impregnable position upon this question,
which cannot be successfully assailed-no matter how skillful or
how subtle may be the attack. Unhappily, however, in other and
inferior courts, wherein the jurisdiction is final, and in some of the
State courts, wherein there is no right of appeal to the Supreme
Court of the United States, there have been frequent instances
of the making of judge-made law by means of judicial legislative
estoppel. The seriousness of this is quite beyond calculation. In
America, to-day, there is hardly any one thing which has contrib-
uted more to the present uneasiness and discontent than the al-
most universal feeling that corporations are not subordinate to
the law-made so apparent to all by the case with which they
escape obedience to it. It is almost citing a platitude to state
that we cannot continue to exist, unless the law remains supreme,
and whenever judge-made law, in a judicial legislative estoppel,
is announced, a dagger is driven, up to its hilt, in the body politic,
ultimately leading-because other like thrusts will surely be made
-to its dissolution. Our country is so large and so charged with
wealth, and the ramifications of its varied interests are so com-
plex, that the influence of one judicial legislative estoppel or
judge-made law is, of course, almost imperceptible; but if, in the
future, our decadence overwhelms us, I take it, the scientific his-
torian will conclude, that, in ho small degree, it owed its origin-
the germ of it, as it were-to the contempt for the supremacy of
the law-a contempt thrust upon our people, as a natural and
rational consequence of the ease with which corporations place
themselves outside of the law. It is perfectly clear that judge-
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made law or judicial legislative estopped has a two-fold effect
upon us all; in each aspect it is very bad: (i) It creates a doubt
as to whether we are really governed by the law, and (2) we all
know the consequences of familiarity, as expressed in the homely
maxim, and this maxim holds true in this case: It is the inevit-
able consequence of the frequent violation of law, that a wide-
spread contempt for the administration of the law is gaining
ground in our country; if corporations are not kept to the law,
why should we be, say the people? Thus, the bacillus of contempt
is given a wonderfully productive feeding ground.
Oh, that all these cases, wherein a judicial legislative estoppel
has been maintained, could, upon final appeal, have reached the
Supreme Court of the United States! But that could not be, and
hence, the purpose of this paper is to make it clear, that whenever
this error has been made, it is not the fault of the law, but of those
who have administered it. And it behooves our courts through-
out the land, for the sake of the national welfare, to be ever
astute to see that they do not, perhaps by reason of some side
issue, which befogs the true issue, fall into the error of announc-
ing a judicial legislative estopped, thereby constituting themselves
makers of the law rather than interpreters of it. Better ten thou-
sand corporations should be kept within the law, rather than a
contempt for it should gain one recruit, for, upon such a ques-
tion, one recruit means many.
Not for one moment do I mean to imply, where a judi-
cial legislative estoppel has been announced, that the court, mak-
ing the decision, has been guilty of a wilful breach of trust.
Whilst it is true that the great mass of the people may so think,-
and just here is the danger,-we lawyers know, very confidently,
that this is very seldom the case. It is generally a pure legal
"slip"--a most unfortunate one, it is true, for its consequences
are direful, in tending to create a contempt for the law. It would,
indeed, be lamentable, if the deliberate purpose of such errors
had been to accomplish that which, I have shown, a judicial legis-
lative estoppel must, inevitably, accomplish-judge-made law. To
maintain this would be to hold corrupt the judiciary who have
so decided, and this I am unwilling to do, because I do not be-
lieve it. Then, how is it that this error has been so often made?
It will be recalled that I referred to this error as a judicial "slip."
Now, the synonymous words of "slip" are: "mistake," "blunder,"
"oversight," and we think that these latter words accurately de-
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scribe, in almost all cases, just what has taken place when
court has sustained an ultra sires contract. The court has r
for one moment realized that it was announcing a judicial legis.
tive estoppel-a positive enormity under our laws-making itst
superior to the law-making power. Of course, it is understood U
use the words ultra sires in their proper sense, that is, ultra tire
not in the sense of a mere lack of power; but ultra sires in th
sense of illegal, something that is unlawful, contra bonos more.
or directly prohibited by the legislative grant. It seems that th-
error--"blunder," "mistake," or "oversight'---has occurred 
i
some such way as this: A party to a continuing corporate con.
tract, containing one ultra vires provision, has attempted to 
hay:
that one clause declared ultra sires, illegal and of no effect in law,
whilst wishing to continue in force all the remainder of the 
con-
tract; or, to state it in another way, to claim the benefits of 
the
contract whilst repudiating the burdens of the ultra tires clause.
In a case of this character, a court, without very great care, could
become mentally impregnated, obsessed with the thought of the
apparent injustice to the corporation, of permitting the other party
to the contract to repudiate the ultra sires clause and yet to re-
tain the benefits of all of the rest of the contract; we repeat, this
apparent injustice could so easily take possession of the judicial
mind-save the very clearest; it has never influenced the Supreme
Court-that it would not appreciate.the fact that in permitting the
ultra sires to stand, it had necessarily exercised-a judicial legis-
lative estoppel.
In cases of the above type, a court could almost logically be
led astray by reasoning somewhat in this way:
"The minds of the parties met in this contract, and agreed to
be bound by its terms; one of these terms, thus agreed to, was
the right of the company to enforce a certain clause, which is
ultra sires and illegal. When the company proceeds to enforce
this clause, in this properly executed c6ntract, the court, of
course-so the reasoning proceeds-will not entertain the plea of
the other party to the contract, that the said clause is ultra vires,
illegal and of no effect in law, at the same time maintaining that
the remainder of the contract is still in force. The court will not
for one moment consider this plea, because it presents an entirely
different contract from the one made by the parties-hence, the
minds of the parties never met in this new contract, and the com-
pany has never agreed to it; if the court were to so proceed it
would be upholding the making of a contract by one party to it,
to bind both parties. Of course, this cannot be done. No! if the
party stands upon the contract, he must stand upon it as an
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entirety, even -though some of its provisions are ultra vires and
illegal of the corporate powers; but he wishes the court
to maintain the contract in force, whilst declaring the ultra
,ires clause illegal and of no effect in law. This we will not do and
we dismiss the bill, leaving the parties as they placed themselves,
and, thus, we permit the entire contract to stand-including the
ultra vires clause."
Now, this reasoning is absolutely sound-looking at the con-
tract as a contract, per se, between the parties, and it is not diffi-
cult to understand how the judicial mind might be shunted from
the true issue. The error of it all, however, is not obscure, and
the "mistake," "oversight," or "blunder," is, in the failure to
recognize the fact that such a contract cannot be regarded solely
as a contract between the corporation and the other contracting
party, wherein the conduct of the latter can be controlled by an
estoppel, and the parties left as they placed themselves, for it
utterly overlooks the fact that the ultra vires provision was illegal
-it was something the legislature has said could not be made.
We have already stated the principle of law, controlling
the application of an estoppel, and we here repeat it: when the
public is not interested the maxim nemo allegans suam turpitudi-
ner audiendus est, is in full force; but, when the public is inter-
ested, the maxim does not apply and it is a positive fact that the
public is interested, equally, when the contract is: (i) contra bonos
mores, or (2), in a corporate contract, when it is ultra vires of the
corporate powers; in both of these cases, the court cannot, by an
estoppel, leave the parties as they have placed themselves. It is
perfectly evident, in both of these cases, that it is of no importance
what the parties may have done. The Supreme Court of the
United States has said repeatedly: "It is of no impor-
tance from which side the evidence of the ultra vires comes,
the disclosure of it is vital; no agreement to waive the
ultra vires can neutralize its effect; it cannot be ratified, because
it cannot be authorized by either party and no performance on
either side can give the unlawful ultra vires any validity, and, as
we have said before, the raison d'etre of all this is: if the court
permits the ultra zires to stand, it is a judicial legislative estoppel,
and the court is assisting the corporation in doing exactly what
the legislature has said it shall not do.
Now, if the courts in these ultra vires cases had decided that the
ultra vires clause destroyed the entire contract, their decisions
would have been perfectly sound; but they reached their conclu-
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sions--erroneous, unquestionably-from a feeling upon their part,
so strong that it has blurred their judicial acumen, that they must
maintain the integrity of the freedom of contract, and, as these
contracts were, per se, legal contracts, properly executed, etc.,
etc., they have supported them in their entirety, overlooking the
fact that a clause in the contract is illegal-something that was
utterly out of the power of the corporation or the other con-
tracting party to agree to, and, furthermore, completely over-
looking the fact, that the maintenance of the contract was a mat-
ter of no consequence at all, in comparison with that which should
have been of the greatest paramount importance to the court-
its not taking any part in assisting in the violation of the law.
These courts should have struck down the ultra vires clause in
any and in every event, maintaining that this did or did not de-
stroy the entire contract, according, as they found this ultra
vires clause to be or not to be a fundamental part of the whole
contract, dependent upon the consideration-a question involving
the law of contracts; that is, as explained in 
U. S. v. Hudson,
12
whether the ultra vires clause was severable from the other pro-
visions or whether all the provisions were a unit. But, let the con-
sequences be what they may to the rest of the contract, an ultra
vires clause should always be declared illegal and void-and
thereby, a court will be saved from falling into the trap of main-
taining a judicial legislative estoppel; unfortunately, the effect of
such an estoppel and its influence is quite the same, even if the
"slip" is only a "mistake," or "blunder," or an "oversight."
I would that this paper could be read by every judge in the
land, for it is incumbent upon them all to see that a judicial legis-
lative estoppel does not "slip" through their courts. No matter
for what reason the estoppel may issue, its effect must be to over-
ride the will of the people as expressed in their legislature as-
sembled. It is bad, irredeemably bad, and, as Mr. Justice Lurton
said in the address referred to, "courts should simply exercise
their judicial powers, and no court should assume legislative
powers." As this statement is founded upon the true principle of
law, it is equally applicable to every court in the land-under no
possible circumstance should any court ever maintain a judicial
legislative estoppel.
It is well that we should all realize--the judiciary, the lawyer
and the layman-just what a judicial legislative estoppel means.
And, first (i), as to the corporation, it means: "No matter how
1210 Wall., 395.
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limited the designs and powers of a corporation may appear in
its charter, practically, it is a corporation without limitations as
to its powers," and it means, also, "that a corporation, no matter
how limited its powers, may make itself omnipotent. It has only
to induce persons to contract with it beyond the scope of its
powers and its very usurpation has the effect of conferring pow-
ers on it which the legislature has withheld." A proposition
more absurd can scarcely be imagined. That is, the court, by its
legislative estoppel, has made the corporation superior to its
creator-the people in legislature assembled; and, secondly (2),
as to the judiciary, it means, that the judiciary has taken unto
itself a higher legislative power than the people themselves, from
whom, of course, all laws emanate; for by its estoppel, the ju-
diciary permits that to be done which the people-speaking
through their legislature-have said cannot be done. Can one
conceive of anything much worse? And the pity of it is, this
error has generally been made through a judicial "slip."
I beg to add, all that I have said applies equally to that which
I might call-executive legislative estoppel and executive judicial
estoppel, and, also to, legislative executive estoppel and legisla-
tive judicial estopped. Our Government is a government of law,
consisting of three co-ordinate branches; let them each be pre-
served in their integrity, else we will surely reap the whirlwind
and deserve it, too. Why is it, that these co-ordinate and co-equal
branches do, from time to time, make thoughtless excursions into
each other's sphere of authority? The greatest respect for the
law is attained by complying with it.
R. Mason Lisle.
